Online Appendix: Additional information on data and measurement Additional information on the time period covered in the statistical analysis
The dataset considers almost all democratic electoral periods (280 in total) in these countries in the post-war period. The following time periods for each country were considered (the number of electoral periods provided in parentheses): Austria 1949 -2008 (18), Belgium 1946 -2010 , Bulgaria 1990 -2009 (6), Czech Republic 1990 -2010 , Denmark 1945 Denmark -2007 , Estonia 1992 -2007 (4), Finland 1945 -2007 , France 1946 France -2007 , Germany 1949 Germany -2009 , Greece 1974 -2009 (11), Hungary 1990 -2010 (5), Ireland 1948 -2007 (16), Italy 1946 -2008 (16), Latvia 1993 -2011 , Lithuania 1992 Lithuania -2008 , Netherlands 1946 Netherlands -2010 , Poland 1991 -2007 (5), Portugal 1975 -2009 , Romania 1990 Romania -2008 , Slovakia 1990 Slovakia -2010 , Slovenia 1990 Slovenia -2008 , Spain 1977 Spain -2008 , Sweden 1944 Sweden -2010 and United Kingdom 1945 Kingdom -2010 .
Note Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are excluded, all of which have the population below 1 million, so is Croatia, which joined the EU only after the data collection was completed.
Additional information on specification of mergers for the empirical analysis
In our large-n analysis we exclude merged parties (listed in Table 1 ) that were to a large degree continuations of one of the constituent parties. We use the change in the merged partys name as a criterion for selecting our cases. Specifically, we only include cases in which the name of the merged party is different from any of its constituent parties. This criterion reflects more reliably the differences in parties strength than those based on their 1 would expect on the basis of the electoral size criterion, the name of the merged party was the hyphenated combination of the names of both parties. This is because the LKD, despite its limited electoral appeal, was in a relatively strong bargaining position due to its relatively strong organization, several local strongholds, the possession of a well-known label and the determination of the TS to unite all centre-right parties.
Additional information on the specification of merger termination (our dependent variable)
Reflecting our earlier conceptualizations, we measure merger terminations as splits from merged parties that lead to the reinstatement of parties similar to one or several of the initial constituent parties. In order to identify such splits, we adopt two strategies. Some mergers in our dataset (for example, the Union of Democratic Centre in Spain) were very complex in that they involved more than five parties. We code as terminations the splits of such mergers if they involve members of a distinct group of constituent parties as opposed to recruiting members from across most parties that were involved in the formation of the merged party. Table 2 summarizes the variation in our dependent and predictor variables.
Measurement of the change in legislative performance after merger
The post-merger change in legislative strength is computed as the percentage ratio of the seat share of the merged party and the sum of the seat share of the merged party and the total seat share of its component parties before a merger. The index can theoretically take values from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates that the merged party gained no seats while the constituent parties obtained at least some legislative representation before a merger.
Conversely, the value of 100 indicates that the merged party gained at least some seats after the merger while the constituent parties had no legislative representation before the merger.
The value of 50 indicates that the seat share of the merged party was equal to the total seat share of constituent parties before the merger. For two cases where both the merged party and all of its constituent parties gained no seats, the value of the measure is assumed to equal 50.
The following example illustrates the computation of the values of this measure. If the constituent parties together obtained 10 percent of seats before the merger, and the merged party gained 5 percent, then the value of the measure for this case would be equal to 5 / (10 +5) * 100 = 33.3. Higher values of this measure indicate a stronger relative performance of the merged party and therefore reduce the probability of a merger failure.
This measure is preferable to the ratio between the seat share of the merged party and the total seat share of its constituent parties because the latter measure is problematic to compute when the constituent parties had no representation. The measure is also advantageous compared to the absolute difference between the seat share of the merged party and its constituent parties, because the latter measure does not account for the (highly plausible)
possibility that the effect of the change in legislative strength would depend on the initial legislative strength of the constituent parties. For example, the post-merger decline in legislative strength of 1 percentage point should have a stronger effect on merger failure when the total seat share of the constituent parties is 5 percent as compared to, say, 20 percent.
Measurement of electoral system disproportionality
As mentioned in section 4.1, Lijphart's effective electoral threshold (Lijphart, 1994) in the last parliamentary election is used to capture the parliamentary entry barrier (H3). This measure integrates information on two key dimensions of electoral systems affecting their disproportionality, namely, district magnitude and legal threshold. While the mean or median district magnitude is frequently used in the literature for measuring electoral system disproportionality, legal thresholds of the size between 3 and 5 percent play a key role in excluding small parties from the legislature in Central and Eastern European countries (Birch, 2003) . The effective threshold is therefore a more appropriate measure of electoral system disproportionality than district magnitude. While Taagepera (2002) proposes a different measure of the nationwide threshold, it seeks to capture the share of the vote necessary for obtaining at least one legislative seat. Lijphart's threshold, while not without its own shortcomings, is nevertheless better suited for measuring the share of the vote required for fair (i.e. proportional) representation. Additional information on the risk profiles guiding the small-N case selection
To understand how the two mergers selected for an in-depth study compare with the result of the sample in terms of the probability of merger failure, we computed the 'risk profile' of each merged party in our sample. Specifically, we first estimate the model with only those predictor variables that were statistically significant in the main analysis presented in the manuscript. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 . Second, we use the 'predict' function in the statistical environment R to compute, for each observation in our sample, the estimated hazard ratio between this observation and the reference value, which is constructed using the mean values on all predictor variables in our sample. The values of this relative risk quantity below (above) 1 therefore indicate that the failure risk for this specific observation is lower (higher) than the risk for the party that has mean values on all predictor variables. As a final step, we take the average relative risk across all years for which the party is included in our sample.
We found that the average risk of the failure of the GroenLinks merger in the first ten years after its formation was the lowest in our sample of 68 merged parties. The value of relative risk for this party was 0.15. The relative risk of failure of the United Socialist Party merger, averaged across all years in which this merged party exited (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) , was the second-highest in our sample, and the value of relative risk for this party was 6.07. It is also worth noting that the risk profiles obtained from the full model presented in the manuscript are very similar to those derived from the reduced model presented in Table 3 .
Specifically, the GroenLinks had the risk profile of 0.19, which was the fourth-lowest in the sample, and the Italian case had a score of 6.79, or the third-highest in the sample.
